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Abstract
This paper presents a construction which transforms categorical mod-
els of additive-free propositional linear logic, closely based on de Paiva’s
dialectica categories and Oliva’s functional interpretations of classical lin-
ear logic. The construction is defined using dependent type theory, which
proves to be a useful tool for reasoning about dialectica categories. Ab-
stractly, we have a closure operator on the class of models: it preserves
soundness and completeness and has a monad-like structure. When ap-
plied to categories of games we obtain ‘games with bidding’, which are
hybrids of dialectica and game models, and we prove completeness theo-
rems for two specific such models.
1 Introduction
This paper presents a construction which transforms categorical models of additive-
free propositional linear logic, closely based on de Paiva’s dialectica categories
and Oliva’s functional interpretations of classical linear logic.
The dialectica categories [6] are a family of models of intuitionistic logic, and
classical and intuitionistic linear logic, based on Go¨del’s dialectica interpreta-
tion. Historically they were the first models of linear logic to not equate multi-
plicative and additive units, and they have been generalised in several ways, for
example [10] defines dialectica categories starting only from a partially ordered
fibration. The construction in this paper is closely related to [5] and [8]; the
similarities and differences between that construction and the original dialectica
categories is discussed in those papers. While most of the literature on dialec-
tica categories aims to construct large classes of structured categories and then
characterise those which are sound models of some logic, the aim of this paper
is rather different: to construct a small number of concrete models which can
be interpreted as game models and are amenable to a proof-theoretic analysis of
the valid formulas, and in particular are as close as possible to being complete
models of linear logic.
Based on de Paiva’s models, [22] gave a syntactic dialectica and Diller-Nahm
interpretation to first order affine logic, and [18] to classical linear logic. The
semantics of the Diller-Nahm variant is explored in detail in chapter 4 of [6], and
will be used in this paper. A completeness theorem is given in [19] for the dialec-
tica interpretation, based on Go¨del’s original completeness theorem for Heyting
arithmetic [1], which has not been exploited so far in the semantic literature.
This relies on a small but crucial modification to de Paiva’s interpretation of the
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linear exponentials. The Diller-Nahm interpretation of linear logic appears in
[18] and [20], although no completeness proof for the Diller-Nahm interpretation
of linear logic appears in the literature, to the author’s knowledge.
The dialectica interpretation, intuitively, is a proof translation which takes a
formula ϕ to a quantifier-free formula |ϕ|
x
y in which the variables x and y appear
free. The variable x represents ‘witnesses’, or evidence that a theorem is true,
and y represents ‘counter-witnesses’, or evidence that a theorem is false. The
validity of a theorem is then reduced to the existence of a witness which defeats
every counter-witness, that is, ∃x∀y. |ϕ|xy . However even if ϕ is a first-order
formula the variables x and y may have higher types. The original purpose was
to prove the relative consistency of Heyting arithmetic to the quantifier-free
language called system T, however the dialectica interpretation is now mainly
used to give a computational interpretation to theorems of classical analysis,
see [14].
The semantic equivalent to the dialectica interpretation, at least from the
point of view of this paper, is to replace the formula |ϕ|
x
y with a double-indexed
family of objects in some model R. We can imagine that we are composing the
syntactic proof translation with a semantic interpretation of formulas. The fact
that the dialectica interpretations of linear negation and multiplicative conjunc-
tion are given recursively by
∣∣ϕ⊥∣∣y
x
=
(
|ϕ|xy
)⊥
|ϕ⊗ ψ|
x,u
f,g = |ϕ|
x
fu ⊗ |ψ|
u
gx
(in particular, that the same connectives occur on the right hand side) tells
us that R must have a sound interpretation of these connectives. This leads
us to the construction in [5], which builds a dialectica category from a posetal
model of multiplicative linear logic, or lineale [7]. The dialectica interpretation
eliminates additives (in the sense that additives do not appear on the right
hand side of the corresponding formulas), and it is also possible to eliminate
exponentials in a sound way by defining
|!ϕ|
x
f = |ϕ|
x
fx
This is the interpretation of exponentials used in all of the literature on dialectica
categories, and also in [22]. However the completeness theorem of [19] relies on
changing this definition to
|!ϕ|
x
f = ! |ϕ|
x
fx
To interpret this semantically R must also have a sound interpretation of the
exponential, which leads to our construction of dialectica categories beginning
from an arbitrary model of multiplicative-exponential linear logic (MELL).
Thus this work can be seen as the result of a ‘dialogue’ between syntax and
semantics.
Overall, we have a construction D which takes a model ofMELL to a model
of LL. The first of two aims of this paper is to explore the abstract properties
of D. We prove in section 6 that D is functorial, and in section 7 it has a
monad-like structure on a particular category of models of MLL, although one
of the monad laws fails and even the weaker result fails to extend to MELL.
This is closely related to the main theorem in [9]. (We could also explore the
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2-categorical properties of D, but that is left for later work.) We also prove that
D preserves soundness (section 3) and completeness (section 5) for MELL, so
we can justify calling it a ‘closure operator’ on models.
The second aim of this paper is to construct specific dialectica categories
which have logical completeness properties. This requires that the underlying
model also has completeness properties, which in practice means constructing
a dialectica category from a category of games. In section 4 we informally
describe such a dialectica category as a category of ‘games with bidding’, greatly
extending the comments in [4] on viewing dialectica categories as game models.
In particular in section 5 we consider ‘Hyland-Ong games with bidding’ based
on [12], and ‘asynchronous games with bidding’ based on [15], and prove that
these models are complete respectively for MLL and MELL.
The model of asynchronous games with bidding, in particular, is an ex-
tremely interesting model because the starting model has the strongest possible
completeness theorem, namely it is fully complete for MELL. An analysis of
the formulas containing additives which are valid in this model will be carried
out in a follow-up paper, but an overview of the argument is given in section 8.
Also in this section we give a simple counterexample proving that there is no
dialectica category which is both sound and complete for full propositional LL.
There are two main technical ideas in this paper which contribute to our
two aims. The first is that we replace the posets of [5] and [13] with categories,
and use dependent type theory in defining and reasoning about our models.
If our metatheory has choice this formally gains nothing, however in practice
dependent type theory proves to be a powerful tool. This will be justified in
particular in sections 5 and 7, which would be hard to formalise without depen-
dent type theory. It also suggests the implementation of this construction (and
the formalisation of the proofs in this paper) in a dependently typed program-
ming language. This would require libraries for 2-category theory and monoidal
category theory, and would be an interesting way to embed linear reasoning into
a proof assistant.
The second idea is that we work with the linear-nonlinear semantics of
MELL and LL given in [3]. This allows the relationship between the linear
and intuitionistic dialectica categories to be clearly seen, and allows us to fac-
tor the exponential into four parts. This also suggests turning back around
to syntax and studying a syntactic dialectica interpretation of linear-nonlinear
logic.
Note that in this paper we are only considering classical linear logic. The
differences between dialectica models of classical and intuitionistic linear logic
are subtle: firstly for intuitionistic linear logic the sets of witnesses and coun-
terexamples must both be nonempty, whereas for classical linear logic one may
be empty; and secondly for intuitionistic linear logic we consider the bids in
games with bidding to be sequential rather than simultaneous. Since the two
logics coincide in the absence of additives, the difference will not often affect us.
2 The dialectica transformations of a category
In this section we will define the two dialectica transformations of a category,
and relate them to the existing literature on dialectica categories. The game-
semantic intuition corresponding to these definitions will be given in section
3
4.
Let R be an arbitrary category. We will define a category Dl(R) called the
linear dialectica transformation of R. The objects of Dl(R) are double-indexed
families GXY where X and Y are arbitrary sets not both empty, and each G
x
y is
an object of R. Throughout this paper we will specify such objects using the
notation
GXY :
(
x
y
)
7→ · · ·
where the right hand side is an expression in terms of x and y. Since X and Y
will often be (dependent) pairs we will drop the parentheses, as is done in the
proof theory literature. Sometimes we will decorate witness and counter-witness
variables with their individual types for clarity, as in
GX×UY×V :
(
x : X,u : U
y : Y, v : V
)
7→ · · ·
A morphism from GXY to H
U
V is an element of a dependent type in the
category of sets:
homDl(R)
(
GXY ,H
U
V
)
=
∑
f :X→U
g:V→Y
∏
x:X
v:V
homR
(
Gxgv ,H
fx
v
)
Hence a morphism is a triple (f, g, α) where f : X → U , g : V → Y and α is a
double-indexed family of R-morphisms
αx,v : G
x
gv → H
fx
v
The proof-theoretic reading of this is that a morphism consists of a witness,
together with a mapping that takes each counter-witness to a proof that the
counter-witness is invalid. This is simply the type-theoretic interpretation of the
usual dialectica interpretation of linear implication, with quantifiers replaced by
dependent types.
For simplicity, in this paper we only explicitly use the set-theoretic inter-
pretation of dependent type theory, however it should be straightforward to
generalise to any model of dependent type theory. This would require R to be
enriched over a locally cartesian closed category C, and that we have a suitable
fibration of objects of R over C to replace set-indexed families, similar to [10]
(this idea was suggested in [11]).
InDl(R) the identity morphism on G
X
Y is given by the identity functions onX
and Y together with identity morphisms in R. The composition of a morphism
GXY ⊸ H
U
V given by (f, g, α) and another H
U
V ⊸ I
P
Q given by (f
′, g′, β) is given
by f ′ ◦ f : X → P and g ◦ g′ : Q→ Y , together with the composition
(β ◦ α)x,q = βfx,v ◦ αx,g′q : homR
(
Gxg(g′q), I
f ′(fx)
q
)
Lemma 1. Let R be any category, then Dl(R) is a category with finite products
and coproducts.
Proof. By proposition 3.7 of [13].
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Using the axiom of choice (at least in the case C = Set), this definition is
equivalent to MN (C) in [5] where N is the posetal reflection of R (assuming
a Grothendeick universe, since R will be large in general). To be clear, this
definition is not intended to be exactly equivalent to the original dialectica
categories in [6], which is more elegant and far more general but is hard to use
for concrete calculations. In particular using type theory gives us explicit names
for all of our morphisms, and this will make our life easier especially in sections 5
and 7. Moreover we can avoid using the axiom of choice in our metatheory, and
so the contents of this paper could be directly implemented in a dependently
typed programming language.
Next we will construct the Diller-Nahm translation Di(S) of an arbitrary
category S with finite products. This construction is mostly closely related to
that in [10], although we consider it in far less generality than in that paper.
The objects of Di(S), as before, are double-indexed families G
X
Y where X and
Y are sets not both empty and each Gxy is an element of S. The hom-sets are
defined by
homDi(S)
(
GXY ,H
U
V
)
=
∑
f :X→U
g:X×V→Y ∗
∏
x:X
v:V
homS

 ∏
y∈g(x,v)
Gxy ,H
fx
v


Here Y ∗ is the set of finite multisets with elements in Y . This definition is the
type-theoretic interpretation of the Diller-Nahm interpretation of intuitionistic
implication
∃fX→U , gX×V→Y
∗
∀xX , vV .
(
∀y ∈ g(x, v). |ϕ|xy
)
→ |ψ|fxv
However we carefully distinguish ‘internal’ and ‘external’ quantifiers: the inter-
nal ∀ is interpreted as the categorical product in the underlying model, and the
external ∃∀ is interpreted as dependent types in C.
In Di(S) the structure is very similar. If we have a morphism given by
f : X → U and g : X × V → Y ∗ and another given by f ′ : U → P and
g′ : U ×Q→ V ∗ the composition is given by f ′ ◦ f : X → P and
λxX , qV .g′(fx, q) >>= λvV .g(x, v) : X ×Q→ Y ∗
together with composition in S. Here >>= is the bind operator of the finite
multiset monad, where l >>= f applies f to each element of l, each giving a
multiset, and collects the results with a union.
Lemma 2. Let S be any category with finite products, then Di(S) is a category
with finite products.
Proof. By section 3 of [10].
3 The dialectica transformation of a linear-nonlinear
adjunction
We begin with a general definition of a model of MELL and a model of LL. A
model of multiplicative linear logic (MLL) is given by a ∗-autonomous category
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R [2], that is, a symmetric monoidal closed category (R,⊗,⊸, 1) with a functor
⊥ : R→ R and natural isomorphisms ⊥◦⊥ ∼= idR and
homR(X ⊗ Y, Z
⊥) ∼= homR(X, (Y ⊗ Z)
⊥)
For the interpretation of exponentials we use the linear-nonlinear semantics
of [3], which is surveyed in detail in [17]. A categorical model ofMELL is given
by a ∗-autonomous category R together with another category S with finite
products and an adjunction
S ⊥ R
L
M
or, more briefly,
L ⊣M : R→ S
Here L (called linearisation) and M (called multiplication) are lax symmetric
monoidal functors, that is, there are natural transformations
M(X)×M(Y )→M(X ⊗ Y ) ⊤ →M(1)
L(X)⊗ L(Y )→ L(X × Y ) 1→ L(⊤)
and the unit and counit of the adjunction must also respect the monoidal and
cartesian monoidal structures (ie. the adjunction must be a symmetric monoidal
adjunction). Such a setup is called a linear-nonlinear adjunction. Given this
adjunction, the denotation of the exponential ! is the composition L ◦M , which
is a comonad on R (and conversely, if we have a model in which ! is given
explicitly we can recover S,M and L from the co-Kleisli adjunction). The entire
model, which contains a pair of categories and functors and various natural
transformations, will be denoted R. For a model of LL we simply require that
R also has finite products.
Given such a model of MELL, the dialectica transformation of this model
will be a new pair of categories and a linear-nonlinear adjunction
Di(S) ⊥ Dl(R)
Ddn(L)
Df (M)
The categories Dl(R) and Di(S) are precisely the categories defined in the
previous section. The transformations of the functors M and L will be given
below. The transformed model as a whole will be denoted D(R).
The interpretations of each connective in Dl(R) is given in figure 1.
Lemma 3. Let R be any ∗-autonomous category, then Dl(R) is a ∗-autonomous
category.
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Multiplicatives
1
{∗}
{∗} :
(
∗
∗
)
7→ 1
⊥
{∗}
{∗} :
(
∗
∗
)
7→ ⊥
(GXY )
⊥ = (G⊥)YX :
(
y
x
)
7→ (Gxy )
⊥
GXY ⊗H
U
V = (G ⊗H)
X×U
(U→Y )×(X→V ) :
(
x, u
f, g
)
7→ Gxfu ⊗H
u
gx
GXY `HUV = (G `H)(V→X)×(Y→U)Y×V :
(
f, g
y, v
)
7→ Gfvy `Hgyv
Additives
⊤
{∗}
∅
0∅{∗}
GXY &H
U
V = (G &H)
X×U
Y+V :
(
x, u
z
)
7→
{
Gxz if z ∈ Y
Huz if z ∈ V
GXY ⊕H
U
V = (G ⊕H)
X+U
Y×V :
(
z
y, v
)
7→
{
Gzy if z ∈ X
Hzv if z ∈ U
Exponentials
!GXY = (!G)
X
X→Y ∗ :
(
x
f
)
7→
⊗
y∈fx
!Gxy
?GXY = (?G)
Y→X∗
Y :
(
g
y
)
7→
¸
x∈gy
?Gxy
Figure 1: Interpretation of constants and connectives in Dl(R)
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Proof. By propositions 3.6 of [13].
Now we give the dialectica transformations Df (M) and Ddn(L) of the mul-
tiplication and linearisation functors. The operation Df is a straightforward
lifting operation. The subscript f stands for functor since this construction
will be used in section 6 to give the action of D on maps (or functors) of
models. Suppose the multiplication functor is M : R → S. The functor
Df (M) : Dl(R)→ Di(S) acts on objects G
X
Y of Dl(R) by
(Df (M)(G))
X
Y :
(
x
y
)
7→M(Gxy )
For the action of Df (M) on morphisms, suppose we have a morphism of Dl(R)
from GXY to H
U
V given by (f, g, α) where f : X → U , g : V → Y and αx,v :
homR
(
Gxgv,H
fx
v
)
. We need to find an element of
∑
f ′:X→U
g′:X×V→Y ∗
∏
x:X
v:V
homS

 ∏
y∈g′(x,v)
M(Gxy ),M(H
f ′x
v )


We take f ′ = f and g′(x, v) to be the multiset containing only gv. Then∏
y∈g′(x,v)
M(Gxy ) =M(G
x
gv)
and so M(αx,v) is a morphism of the correct type.
Suppose the linearisation functor is L : S → R. The functor Ddn(L) :
Di(S)→ Dl(R) acts on objects G
X
Y by
(Ddn(L)(G))
X
X→Y ∗ :
(
x
f
)
7→
⊗
y∈fx
L(Gxy )
Here
⊗
y∈fx is the fold of the monoidal product of R over the finite multiset
fx, where the fold over the empty multiset is the unit 1 ∈ R. The subscript dn
stands for Diller-Nahm, since this definition contains the essence of the Diller-
Nahm functional interpretation. The intuitive justification for this definition is
that the exponential Ddn(L) ◦Df (M) should be an interpretation of
!∀y ∈ fx. |ϕ|xy
which is the Diller-Nahm interpretation of the exponentials in [18]. Since we
are working over set theory we ‘know’ the (finite) size of fx, so we can replace
the ∀ with a folded &. (This is a subtle point: we are simply defining a family
of formulas, whereas when using free variables a formula must have a fixed
structure.) Then we use the fact that ! is strong monoidal (the ‘transmutation
principle’ of linear logic, see section 7.1 of [17]) to obtain⊗
y∈fx
! |ϕ|
x
y
When this is factored as ⊗
y∈fx
L
(
M |ϕ|
x
y
)
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the M becomes absorbed into the definition of Df (M), and we are left with
Ddn(L). (We could write it instead as L&, but using ⊗L gives the exponential
in figure 1 directly. Taking the exponential to be ⊗! is preferable to !& because
we need not assume that L has products.)
Now suppose we have a morphism of Di(S) from G
X
Y to H
U
V given by (f, g, α)
where f : X → U , g : X × V → Y ∗ and
αx,v : homS

 ∏
y∈g(x,v)
Gxy ,H
fx
v


We need to find an element of
homDl(R)
(
(Ddn(L)(G))
X
X→Y ∗ , (Ddn(L)(H))
U
U→V ∗
)
The witnesses are f : X → U and g′ : (U → V ∗)→ (X → Y ∗) given by
g′ = λhU→V
∗
, xX .h(fx) >>= λvV .g(x, v)
Given x ∈ X and h : U → V ∗ we need to find an element of
homR
(
(Ddn(L)(G))
x
g′h, (Ddn(L)(H))
fx
h
)
= homR

 ⊗
y∈g′hx
L(Gxy ),
⊗
v∈h(fx)
L(Hfxv )


We have
⊗
v∈h(fx)
L(αx,v) : homR

 ⊗
v∈h(fx)
L

 ∏
y∈g(x,v)
Gxy

 , ⊗
v∈h(fx)
L(Hfxv )


Here we can use that L is a symmetric monoidal functor to get an element of
homR

 ⊗
v∈h(fx)
⊗
y∈g(x,v)
L(Gxy ),
⊗
v∈h(fx)
L(Hfxv )


Finally the left hand side can be written as a single monoidal product over
y ∈ g′hx by definition of the monadic bind.
Lemma 4. Ddn(L) ⊣ Df (M) : Dl(R) → Di(S) is a linear-nonlinear adjunc-
tion.
Proof. By proposition 14 of [17] it suffices to prove that Ddn(L) ⊣ Df (M) is an
adjunction and Ddn(L) is strong symmetric monoidal.
The equation for the adjunction is
homDl(R)
(
Ddn(L)(G
X
Y ),H
U
V
)
∼= homDi(S)
(
GXY ,Df (M)(H
U
V )
)
We evaluate
homDl(R)
(
Ddn(L)(G
X
Y ),H
U
V
)
=
∑
f :X→U
g:V→(X→Y ∗)
∏
x:X
v:V
homR
( ⊗
y∈gvx
L(Gxy ),H
fx
v
)
9
and
homDi(S)
(
GXY ,Df(M)(H
U
V )
)
=
∑
f :X→U
g:X×V→Y ∗
∏
x:X
v:V
homS

 ∏
y∈g(x,v)
Gxy ,M(H
fx
v )


These are isomorphic using L ⊣M and the fact that L is strong monoidal.
To prove that Ddn(L) is strong monoidal we must show that
Ddn(L)(G
X
Y )⊗Ddn(L)(H
U
V )
∼= Ddn(L)(G
X
Y &H
U
V )
We evaluate
(Ddn(L)(G) ⊗Ddn(L)(H))
X×U
(X×U→Y ∗)×(X×U→V ∗) :
(
x, u
f, g
)
7→
⊗
y∈f(x,u)
L(Gxy )⊗
⊗
v∈g(x,u)
L(Huv )
and
Ddn(L)(G &H)
X×U
X×U→(Y+V )∗ :
(
x, u
h
)
7→
⊗
z∈h(x,u)
{
L(Gxz ) if z ∈ Y
L(Huz ) if z ∈ V
These are isomorphic due to the natural isomorphism Y ∗×V ∗ ∼= (Y +V )∗ (note
that this isomorphism does not hold if we replace finite multisets with finite
ordered lists, ie. free commutative monoids by free noncommutative monoids).
Finally, the symmetry of Ddn(L) also inherits easily from that of L.
We can therefore derive the interpretation of ! as the composition Ddn(L) ◦
Df (M). Given an object G
x
y , its exponential is
(!G)XX→Y ∗ :
(
x
f
)
7→
⊗
y∈fx
!Gxy
where the exponential in the underlying model is ! = L ◦M .
It is worth noting that, as in chapter 4 of [6], the functor Ddn(L) factors
into three parts Ddn(L) = B ◦A ◦Df(L) where A and B (called T and S in [6])
are endofunctors on Dl(R) given respectively by
(A(G))XY ∗ :
(
x
s
)
7→
⊗
y∈s
Gxy
and
(B(G))XX→Y :
(
x
f
)
7→ Gxfx
We can interpret A and B game-semantically as giving two different advantages
to Abelard. A allows Abelard to play several moves, and B allows Abelard to
observe Eloise’s move. Both of these are expressed by monads on the category
of sets, respectively the finite multiset monad and the reader monad (X →).
The exponential of Dl(R) therefore factors into four parts as
B ◦A ◦Df (L) ◦Df (M)
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The functors A and B have much structure in their own right: they are both
comonads on Dl(R) with a distributivity law between them making B ◦A into
another comonad. However B ◦ A is a linear exponential comonad (which is
a direct categorical semantics of the exponential, see [13]), whereas A and B
individually are not. The entire reason we also compose with Df (L)◦Df(M) =
Df (L ◦M), which after all requires more structure in the underlying model, is
to obtain the completeness theorem in section 5.
The lemmas in this section add up to a soundness theorem.
Theorem 1. If R is a sound model of MELL then D(R) is a sound model of
LL.
4 Games with bidding
In section 5 we will investigate applying the transformation D to models which
are complete (that is truth implies provability, which is a weaker property than
full completeness which is more often considered). In practice this means letting
R be a game model. In this section we give some general remarks about D(R)
when R is a game model.
In general, a game model is a category R whose objects are games, and
whose morphisms are (relative) winning strategies. Thus logically formulas are
denoted by games and proofs by winning strategies. The denotation of linear
negation is interchange of players (at least for classical linear logic), and the
denotation of ⊗ is some form of concurrent play, making R into a *-autonomous
category. For models which have additives the product G&H is usually denoted
by a game in which Abelard chooses which of the two games will be played, and
for G⊕H Eloise makes the choice. The exponential is often similar to an infinite
tensor product. The point of making these informal observations is that they
are preserved under the transformation D.
We begin by considering the two-element boolean algebra B as a degenerate
game model containing only two games: one which Eloise wins immediately, and
one which Abelard wins immediately. Thus we can see D(B), which is called
G(C) in the terminology of [6] (where C is the category of sets or another suitable
model of dependent type theory), as a model of games with bidding in which
the games contain only the bidding round, and after the bidding round one
player is declared to have won. The possibility of viewing dialectica categories
as categories of games has been discussed in several places, and in particular in
the final section of [4], and this section greatly extends that idea.
One issue with viewing dialectica categories as games is the strange ‘causal-
ity’ in a game such as GXY ⊸ H
U
V , in which u depends on x but not v, and y
depends on v but not x. One way to view the strange dynamics of this game is
as a generalisation of history-freeness in which the moves are chosen in the order
(x, u, v, y), where Abelard’s strategy to choose x, v is history-free and Eloise’s
strategy may depend on the most recent move but not the remainder of the
history. Alternatively we can imagine the bidding round to be played by two
teams of two players (like Bridge) with a particular message-passing protocol
11
XU
Y
V
Partners sit opposite each other, with X and Y representing Abelard and U
and V representing Eloise, and the arrows representing the direction of message-
passing. Unfortunately both of these intuitions (history-freeness and message-
passing) break down when we consider higher order bids (that is, bids which are
functions depending on other functions). There is a general but less satisfactory
intuition in these cases: the players submit (higher order) computer programs,
which are finite representations of their strategy, to play on their behalf.
Now we consider informally a ‘general non-degenerate game model’. The
conclusion is that the construction D, which can be applied to any model,
preserves the property of ‘being a game model’. For a concrete game model
these informal remarks could be made precise: the simplest example is the
category of Blass games of [4]; in section 5 we consider the category of Hyland-
Ong games [12] and the category of asynchronous games of [15].
An object GXY of Dl(R) consists of sets of bids X and Y for Eloise and
Abelard, together with a game Gxy in the underlying model for each pair of bids.
Thus a winning strategy for Eloise consists of a bid x ∈ X , together with a
winning strategy σy for G
x
y for every bid y of Abelard. Thus G
X
Y can be seen as
a game with bidding: first Eloise and Abelard simultaneously bid, and then the
pair of chosen bids determines precisely which subsequent game will be played.
(Very informally this is somewhat like the game of Bridge: there is an initial
bidding round which determines exactly which variant of Whist will be played.)
The negation of Dl(R) is to interchange players in the bidding round and
then apply the negation of R. Thus when R is a game model the negation
of Dl(R) overall is simply interchange of players in the compound game. The
other connectives which behave very cleanly are the additives: they are similar
to the additives in a general game model except that the choice of which game to
play occurs simultaneously with the other bids. Thus for example in the game
GXY &H
U
V Abelard chooses a game and a bid for that game, but since Eloise bids
simultaneously she must choose a bid for both games. Thus a winning strategy
for Eloise in GXY & H
U
V consists of a pair of bids (x, u) together with winning
strategies for both Gxy and H
u
v .
The denotation of the tensor product GXY ⊗H
U
V is more complicated. Eloise
simply bids a pair (x, u). Simultaneously Abelard must bid a pair of functions
f : U → Y and g : X → V , and then the games Gxfu and H
u
gx are played in
parallel in the sense specified by R. Similarly the exponential !GXY is played as
follows. Firstly Eloise chooses a bid x ∈ X . Then Abelard observes this and
chooses a finite multiset y1, . . . , yn ∈ Y . For each yi there is an exponential
!Gxyi , which will be similar to the parallel composition of infinitely many copies
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of Gxyi . Then each of the !G
x
yi
is played in parallel (but typically a different sense
of parallel than is used for exponentials), leading to n ·ω games being played in
parallel. However the notion of winning strategy for Eloise in these games will
depend on exactly what notion of parallelism is used in R, so it is difficult to
say more in general.
As explained above, in some cases it is possible to consider this as a game
played by two pairs of partners with a message-passing protocol, but in general
it is necessary to consider functions which can depend on other functions in a
higher-order way. Thus from a game-semantic perspective it will be more sat-
isfying to replace the category of sets with a different locally cartesian closed
category in which functions contain only a finite amount of information. Partic-
ularly interesting would be to use the recent work in progress of Abramsky and
Jagadeesan on game semantics of dependent type theory. This would lead to a
two-layered game model in which the bidding round has finer structure and the
bids themselves specify strategies for sub-games. The difficulty would be to find
a suitable sense in which R is enriched and fibered over the model of dependent
types.
5 Relative completeness for additive-free frag-
ments
Definition 1 (Complete model). Let R be a model of LL. A mapping from
atoms to objects of R is called a valuation in R. Given a valuation v, we can
extend it inductively to an interpretation of formulas in R, denoted JϕKv or
simply JϕK.
R is called a complete model of LL if for all formulas ϕ, ψ, if homR(JϕKv , JψKv)
is nonempty for all valuations v then the sequent ϕ ⊢ ψ is derivable in LL.
Completeness for MELL and other fragments is defined similarly.
A characterisation theorem for a functional interpretation is a result say-
ing that the equivalence between ϕ and its functional interpretation ∃x∀y. |ϕ|
x
y
is derivable in some system, usually a base language like HAω extended with
characterisation principles, which are axioms validated by the functional inter-
pretation such as the axiom of choice, Markov’s principle and independence of
premise. In order to obtain the statement of the following lemma we take the
logical formula
ϕ↔ ∃x∀y. |ϕ|xy
and split the bi-implication into its defining conjunction, then in each part we
prenex the quantifiers and interpret them as dependent types.
The characterisation theorem for classical linear logic in [19] uses not ∃x∀y
but a Henkin quantifier,
Æx
y , and so this ‘rearrangement’ is unsound. The result
we see is that this lemma fails to extend from MELL to LL. (Given that
this simultaneity is at the heart of the functional interpretations of classical
linear logic, it is remarkable that this method works at all.) See section 8 for a
discussion of how to extend the completeness theorem to include additives by
correctly interpreting the simultaneous quantifier.
Lemma 5. Let R be a model of MELL and let v be a valuation in R. Let ϕ be
a formula of MELL with interpretation |ϕ|
X
Y in D(R), where the interpretation
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of an atomic proposition is
|p|
{∗}
{∗} :
(
∗
∗
)
7→ v(p)
Then the types ∑
x:X
∏
y:Y
homR(JϕK, |ϕ|
x
y)
and ∑
y:Y
∏
x:X
homR(|ϕ|
x
y , JϕK)
are inhabited.
Proof. These are proved simultaneously by induction on ϕ. In the base case we
have ϕ = p is an atom, and the point ∗ and identity morphism witnesses both
(1) and (2).
In the negation case for (1) the inductive hypothesis for (2) gives y ∈ Y
together with morphisms πx : homR(|ϕ|
x
y , JϕK). Then π
⊥
x : homR(Jϕ
⊥K,
∣∣ϕ⊥∣∣y
x
).
The case for (2) is symmetric.
For (1) of ⊗ the inductive hypothesis gives x and u together with morphisms
πy : homR(JϕK, |ϕ|
x
y) and σv : homR(JψK, |ψ|
u
v ). Then for each f : U → Y and
g : X → V we have
πfu ⊗ σgx : homR
(
Jϕ⊗ ψK, |ϕ⊗ ψ|x,uf,g
)
For (2) of ⊗ the inductive hypothesis gives y and v together with morphisms
πx : homR(|ϕ|
x
y , JϕK) and σu : homR(|ψ|
u
v , JψK). Define f : U → Y by fu = y
and g : X → V by gx = v. Then for each (x, u) we have
πx ⊗ σu : homR
(
|ϕ⊗ ψ|
x,u
f,g , Jϕ ⊗ ψK
)
For (1) of !, by the inductive hypothesis we have x together with morphisms
in πy : homR(JϕK, |ϕ|
x
y). Let f : X → Y
∗. We have
⊗
y∈fx
!πy : homR

⊗
y∈fx
!JϕK,
⊗
y∈fx
! |ϕ|
x
y


Since R is a model of MELL we have
⊗
y∈fx !JϕK
∼= !JϕK and we are done.
For (2) of !, by the inductive hypothesis we have y together with morphisms
πx : homR(|ϕ|
x
y , JϕK). Take f to be the constant function returning the singleton
multiset containing y. Then we have
!πx : homR(
⊗
y∈fx
! |ϕ|
x
y , !JϕK)
and we are done.
Theorem 2 (Relative completeness). Let R be a model of MELL and let ϕ be
a formula of MELL which is true in D(R). Then ϕ is true in R.
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Proof. Let v be a valuation in R, and let ϕ be a formula of MELL with in-
terpretation |ϕ|
X
Y in D(R) using the same interpretation of atomic propositions
defined in the lemma. Since ϕ is true in D(R) we have a winning bid x : X
together with winning strategies
πy : homR(1, |ϕ|
x
y)
From (2) of the lemma we have y : Y together with winning strategies
σx : homR(|ϕ|
x
y , JϕK)
Therefore
σx ◦ πy : homR(1, JϕK)
Since this holds for every valuation, ϕ is true in R.
Let HO be the category of Hyland-Ong games and history-free, uniformly
winning strategies [12], with the the identity functor considered as an exponen-
tial. Then D(HO) is the model of ‘Hyland-Ong games with bidding’. (As a
linear-nonlinear adjunction, the model of Hyland-Ong games has R = S = HO,
and L =M is the identity functor.)
Corollary 1. D(HO) is a sound model of LL and a complete model of MLL.
Notice that because the posetal reflection of HO is a lineale in the sense of
[5] (including having a trivial exponential), the category D(HO) is an example
of the construction in that paper (modulo size issues). However examples of
this kind have not been considered before, and in particular the completeness
result is new.
Let AG be the category Z of asynchronous games and (equivalence classes
of) innocent winning strategies [15]. This is a sound model of LL which is proven
in [16] to be complete for MELL. That paper also provides a small variation
which is complete for LL, although using that model will not be necessary for
our purposes.
Corollary 2. D(AG), the category of asynchronous games with bidding, is a
sound model of LL and a complete model of MELL.
A large part of the motivation for this paper is to introduce the category
D(AG) and prove its soundness. It is an interesting model which will be studied
in detail by the author in a follow-up paper: in particular there is a way to
analyse the formulas containing additives which are valid in the model. See
section 8 for a summary of the argument.
6 D is a functor
Given a model R ofMELL, presented as a linear-nonlinear adjunction, we have
defined a model D(R) of LL. Since a collection of models forms a category we
can ask whether D is a functor. The answer is ‘yes’ for the strongest notion
of a morphism of models: a pair of functors which commute with all of our
structure. Results of this kind are standard, and appear as early as [21]. In
the next section we will need a weaker notion of morphism of models of MLL,
namely lax monoidal functors between ∗-autonomous categories.
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Since models are pairs of structured categories, they moreover form a 2-
category, with 1-cells given by pairs of monoidal functors satisfying suitable
conditions, and 2-cells given by pairs of natural transformations. We will leave
the consideration of 2-categorical issues for later work, but it should be noted
that most of the diagrams in this section and the next commute only up to
natural isomorphism.
This section and the next do not contain all cases of the proofs (which
would take another paper), but highlight the most interesting cases. Most of
the proofs amount to showing that certain (sometimes quite formidable) depen-
dent types are inhabited, and thus are natural candidates for formalisation in a
dependently typed programming language, with suitable libraries for monoidal
category theory and 2-category theory. The author intends to carry this out in
the future.
Definition 2 (Morphism of linear-nonlinear adjunctions). Let L ⊣M : R→ S
and L′ ⊣ M ′ : R′ → S′ be linear-nonlinear adjunctions. A morphism (F,G)
from the former to the latter consists of functors
S ⊥ R
S′ ⊥ R′
L
M
L′
M ′
G F
such that
1. F is a monoidal functor
2. F and G are cartesian monoidal functors
3. The following diagram commutes:
R S R
R′ S′ R′
M L
F G F
M ′ L′
(If we weaken this to having natural transformations M ′ ◦ F =⇒ G ◦M and
L′ ◦ G =⇒ F ◦ L we obtain the linear-nonlinear equivalent of the ‘map of
models’ of [13].)
The category of linear-nonlinear adjunctions and morphisms will be called
LL -Mod. The (larger) category of linear-nonlinear adjunctions in which R
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and R′ do not necessarily have products (and F is not necessarily cartesian
monoidal) will be calledMELL -Mod. There is a forgetful functor U : LL -Mod→
MELL -Mod.
Lemma 6. D is a functor MELL -Mod→ LL -Mod.
Proof. We need to prove that
Di(S) ⊥ Dl(R)
Di(S
′) ⊥ Dl(R
′)
Ddn(L)
Df (M)
Ddn(L
′)
Dl(M
′)
Df (G) Df (F )
is a morphism of LL -Mod, given that (F,G) is a morphism of MELL -Mod.
We will prove the conditions for exponentials, namely that we have commut-
ing squares
Dl(R) Di(S) Dl(R)
Dl(R
′) Di(S
′) Dl(R
′)
Df (M) Ddn(L)
Df (F ) Df (G) Df (F )
Df (M
′) Ddn(L
′)
For the left hand square let GXY ∈ Dl(R). We have
((Df (M
′) ◦Df (F ))(G))
X
Y :
(
x
y
)
7→ (M ′ ◦ F )(Gxy )
((Df (G) ◦Df (M))(G))
X
Y :
(
x
y
)
7→ (G ◦M)(Gxy )
These are equivalent using the identity functions on X and Y and the natural
isomorphismM ′ ◦F ∼= G◦M . For the right hand square let GXY ∈ Di(S). Then
we have
((Ddn(L
′) ◦Df (G))(G))
X
X→Y ∗ :
(
x
f
)
7→
⊗
y∈fx
(L′ ◦G)(Gxy )
((Df (F ) ◦Ddn(L))(G))
X
X→Y ∗ :
(
x
f
)
7→ F

⊗
y∈fx
L(Gxy )


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Using the identity functions on X and X → Y ∗ together with the natural
isomorphism L′ ◦ G ∼= F ◦ L and the fact that F is monoidal we have natural
transformations
⊗
y∈fx
(L′ ◦G)(Gxy )
∼=
⊗
y∈fx
(F ◦ L)(Gxy )
∼= F

⊗
y∈fx
L(Gxy )


7 D is not a monad
We have defined D as a functor MELL -Mod → LL -Mod. By composing
with the forgetful functor in the opposite direction we obtain an endofunctor
on MELL -Mod. In this section we will investigate a monad-like structure
on D. The starting point is the observation that there is a family of functors
µR : D
2
l (R) → Dl(R) which appears to be the multiplication of a monad. In
this section we investigate this structure and show that, on the contrary, D
is not a monad. The functors µR behave badly with respect to exponentials,
and the corresponding functors µS : D
2
i (S) → Di(S) cannot be defined in a
reasonable way. Even when restricting to just MLL, the functors µR are only
lax monoidal, and the second monad law fails to hold, even in a lax way.
The main theorem of [9], which gives a sense in which the dialectica inter-
pretation is a pseudo-monad, is extremely closely related. There are two main
differences, other than the fact that our dialectica categories are far less general.
The first is that Hofstra’s multiplication operator, from a game-semantic point
of view, treats the two players asymmetrically, and so appears to be incompat-
ible with classical linear logic. The second is that, by using linear-nonlinear
semantics, we insist on soundness for linear logic with exponentials. Neverthe-
less the second monad law does not appear to rely on either of these facts, which
implies that the constructions are more different than they appear.
This section is interesting for two reasons. Firstly by replacing the term
‘functor’ with ‘proof translation’ the fact that functional interpretations fail to
be monads becomes a fact about proof theory, essentially that functional inter-
pretations do not commute as much as possible with other proof translations.
Secondly the ‘multiplication’ operator µR is actually important in the study of
the dialectica interpretation of additives, as explained in the next section. For-
tunately, although some of the types in this section are formidable, the action
of the µ operator on objects is simple and intuitive.
There are several parts to the construction (again, without considering 2-
categorical aspects). Firstly we describe the unit ηR : R → D(R), which is a
map of models. Then we describe D2(R) explicitly, and explore the multiplica-
tion operation. The resulting setup is illustrated in figure 2. Finally we must
consider the monad laws. In practice we will focus on the parts which are both
interesting (in particular, the cases which fail), and are practical to write by
hand.
We will begin with the natural transformation η : I → D, where I is the
identity functor on MELL -Mod. The functor
ηR : R→ Dl(R)
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S ⊥ R
Di(S) ⊥ Dl(R)
D
2
i (S) ⊥ D
2
l (R)
L
M
ηS ηR
Ddn(L)
Df (M)
µR
D
2
dn(L)
D
2
f (M)
Figure 2: Unit and multiplication of D
takes an object x ∈ R to the game with one play and outcome x,
(ηR(x))
{∗}
{∗} :
(
∗
∗
)
7→ x
(recall that this is precisely the valuation of atoms in section 5). It takes a
morphism π : homR(x, y) to the strategy (id, id, π) where id is the identity
function on {∗}. The functor
ηS : S → Di(S)
is similar. To be clear about notation, the components of η are ηR, where ηR
is a lax morphism of models consisting of the functors (ηR, ηS).
Lemma 7. η is a well-defined natural transformation I→ D.
Next we explicitly find D2(R) as a model of MELL. An object GXY of
D
2
l (R) consists of sets X and Y together with a family of objects G
x
y of Dl(R).
Each such Gxy itself has the form (G
x
y )
Uxy
V xy
, where Uxy and V
x
y are families of sets
dependent on x and y, and we have a family of objects (Gxy )
u
v of R. This defines
the objects of both categories D2l (R) and D
2
i (S).
Consider objects GXY and H
W
Z of D
2
l (R) given by (G
x
y )
Uxy
V xy
and (Hwz )
Pwz
Qwz
, and
consider a morphism from G to H. This consists of functions f : X → W
and g : Z → Y together with morphisms from Gxgz to H
fx
z in Dl(R). Each such
morphism itself consists of functions α : Uxgz → P
fx
z and β : Q
fx
z → V
x
gz together
with morphisms in R. Thus we have
homD2
l
(R)(G,H) =
∑
f :X→W
g:Z→Y
∏
x:X
z:Z
∑
α:Uxgz→P
fx
z
β:Qfxz →V
x
gz
∏
u:Uxgz
q:Qfxz
homR
(
(Gxgz)
u
βq, (H
fx
z )
αu
q
)
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Morphisms in D2i (S) are much more complicated and will not be considered
here. In order to complete the picture we would also need to consider D2f (M)
and D2dn(L), but we will not do so here.
By thinking of D2(R) as a game model the definition of µR becomes obvious.
We begin with a game model R ofMLL, and prepend a bidding round to obtain
Dl(R), then prepend an earlier bidding round to obtain D
2
l (R). A strategy for
a game in this model consists of a bid in the first bidding round, together with
a bid in the second bidding round for each possible bid of the opponent, and
finally a strategy for each resulting game. This can be converted into a game
with a single bidding round by bidding dependent types. Formally, given GXY in
D
2
l (R) given by (G
x
y )
Uxv
V xy
, we define the object µR(G) of Dl(R) by
(µR(G))
∑
x:X
∏
y:Y U
x
y∑
y:Y
∏
x:X V
x
y
:
(
x, f
y, g
)
7→ (Gxy )
fy
gx
We will begin by showing that µR is lax monoidal but not strong monoidal.
Suppose we have games GXY ,H
W
Z ∈ D
2
l (R) given by
(Gxy )
Uxy
V xy
:
(
u
v
)
7→ (Gxy )
u
v
and
(Hwz )
Pwz
Qwz
:
(
p
q
)
7→ (Hwz )
p
q
We need to construct a relative winning strategy
µRG ⊗ µRH⊸ µR(G ⊗H)
We have
(µRG ⊗ µRH)
∑
x:X
∑
x:X
∏
y:Y U
x
y×
∑
w:W
∏
z:Z P
w
z
(
∑
w:W
∏
z:Z P
w
z →
∑
y:Y
∏
x:X V
x
y )×(
∑
x:X
∏
y:Y U
x
y→
∑
z:Z
∏
w:W Q
w
z )
and
(µR(G ⊗H))
∑
(x,w):X×W
∏
(f,g):(W→Y )×(X→Z)(U
x
fw×P
u
gx)∑
(f,g):(W→Y )×(X→Z)
∏
(x,w):X×W ((P
u
gx→V
x
fw
)×(Ux
fw
→Qugx))
To define a function
Φ :
∑
x:X
∏
y:Y
Uxy ×
∑
w:W
∏
z:Z
Pwz →
∑
(x,w):X×W
∏
(f,g):
(W→Y )×(X→Z)
(Uxfw × P
u
gx)
suppose we are given ((x, α), (w, β)) where α : (y : Y )→ Uxy and β : (z : Z)→
Pwz . We need to define
F : ((f, g) : (W → Y )× (X → Z))→ Uxfw × P
u
gx
which can be given by
F (f, g) = (α(fw), β(gx))
In the other direction we need to define a function
Ψ :
∑
(f,g):
(W→Y )×(X→Z)
∏
(x,w):X×W
((Pugx → V
x
fw)× (U
x
fw ×Q
u
gx))→
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
∑
w:W
∏
z:Z
Pwz →
∑
y:Y
∏
x:X
V xy

×

∑
x:X
∏
y:Y
Uxy →
∑
z:Z
∏
w:W
Qwz


Consider the left projection of this function (the right projection is symmetric).
As input we are given the data
f :W → Y
g : X → Z
F : ((x,w) : X ×W )→ ((Pwfx → V
x
fw)× (U
x
fw ×Q
u
gx))
w :W
h : (z : Z)→ Pwz
We must produce y : Y and h′ : (x : X)→ V xy . We take y = fw and
h′x = πL(F (x,w))(h(gx))
Note that neither of Φ and Ψ can be canonically reversed, so µR is not strong
monoidal.
Now, however, we consider the pair of games !µR(G) and µR(!G). The former
is
(!µR(G))
∑
x:X
∏
y:Y U
x
y
∑
x:X
∏
y:Y U
x
y→(
∑
y:Y
∏
x:X V
x
y )
∗ :
(
x, f
F
)
7→
⊗
(y,g)∈F (x,f)
!(Gxy )
fy
gx
The latter, which takes some work to calculate, is
(µR(!G))
∑
x:X
∏
f:X→Y ∗
∏
y∈fx
Uxy
∑
f:X→Y ∗
∏
x:X(
∏
y∈fx
Uxy→
∏
y∈fx
(V xy )
∗)
:
(
x, F
f,G
)
7→
⊗
y∈fx
⊗
v∈Gx(Ff)y
!(Gxy )
Ffy
v
The counter-witness types of these are incomparable, in the sense that there is
no function in either direction which is natural in the types. Therefore we can
say that µ : D2l → Dl is a well-defined natural transformation on the category
of models of MLL and lax morphisms, but does not extend to MELL.
The linear-nonlinear semantics gives us a better perspective on this problem.
We can think of objects of Di(S) as games with bidding, but in which in the
bidding round Abelard has the advantages granted by the exponential, namely
he can observe Eloise’s move and then choose several possible moves. In partic-
ular, the sequentiality of the bidding prevents us from extending our intuition
about µR to D
2
i (S). A compound game in D
2
i (S) has two bidding rounds which
are each played sequentially, and so bids are made in the order ∃∀∃∀. We cannot
reduce this to a single round of dependent bidding, because there is no way to
specify that Abelard’s first bid cannot depend on Eloise’s second bid.
Restricting to MLL, the first monad law holds up to natural isomorphism.
Theorem 3. There are natural isomorphisms
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Dl(R) D2l (R)
D
2
l (R) Dl(R)
ηDl(R)
µRDf (ηR)
µR
Proof. Consider an object GXY of Dl(R). We can directly compute:
((µR ◦ ηDl(R))(G))
∑
∗
∏
∗
X
∑
∗
∏
∗
Y
:
(
∗, f
∗, g
)
7→ Gf∗g∗
and
((µR ◦Df (ηR))(G))
∑
x
∏
y{∗}∑
y
∏
x
{∗} :
(
x, f
y, g
)
7→ Gxy
These are both naturally isomorphic to GXY .
The second monad law
D
3
l (R) D
2
l (R)
D
2
l (R) Dl(R)
µDl(R)
µRDf (µR)
µR
fails, even in a lax way (that is, this diagram does not contain a 2-cell). Consider
an object of D3l (R) given by
G :
(
x : X
y : Y
)
7→
(
u : Uxy
v : V xy
)
7→
(
p : (P xy )
u
v
q : (Qxy)
u
v
)
7→ ((Gxy )
u
v )
p
q
We can directly compute
(Df (µR))(G) :
(
x : X
y : Y
)
7→
(
u, α :
∑
u:U
∏
v:V (P
x
y )
u
v
v, β :
∑
v:V
∏
u:U (Q
x
y)
u
v
)
7→ ((Gxy )
u
v )
αu
βv
Therefore
(µR ◦Df (µR))(G)
∑
x:X
∏
y:Y
∑
u:U
∏
v:V (P
x
y )
u
v∑
y:Y
∏
x:X
∑
v:V
∏
u:U (Q
x
y)
u
v
:
(
x, f, α
y, g, β
)
7→ ((Gxy )
fy
gx)
αy(gx)
βx(fy)
We also get
µDl(R)(G) :
(
x, f :
∑
x:X
∏
y:Y U
x
y
y, g :
∑
y:Y
∏
x:X V
x
y
)
7→
(
p : (P xy )
fy
gx
q : (Qxy)
fy
gx
)
7→ ((Gxy )
fy
gx)
p
q
22
Then (µR ◦ µDl(R))(G) involves nested dependent types:
(µR◦µD(R))(G)
∑
(x,f:
∑
x:X
∏
y:Y U
x
y )
∏
(y,g:
∑
y:Y
∏
x:X V
x
y )
(Pxy )
fy
gx
∑
(y,g:
∑
y:Y
∏
x:X V
x
y )
∏
(x,f:
∑
x:X
∏
y:Y U
x
y )
(Qxy)
fy
gx
:
(
x, f, F
y, g,G
)
7→ ((Gxy )
fy
gx)
F (y,g)
G(x,f)
There is a natural transformation∑
x:X
∏
y:Y
∑
u:U
∏
v:V
(P xy )
u
v →
∑
(x,f :
∑
x:X
∏
y:Y U
x
y )
∏
(y,g:
∑
y:Y
∏
x:X V
x
y )
(P xy )
fy
gx
defined by
(x, f, α) 7→ (x, f, λ(y, g).αy(gx))
However there is none in the opposite direction. Similarly there is a natural
transformation∑
y:Y
∏
x:X
∑
v:V
∏
u:U
(Qxy)
u
v →
∑
(y,g:
∑
y:Y
∏
x:X V
x
y )
∏
(x,f :
∑
x:X
∏
y:Y U
x
y )
(Qxy)
fy
gx
but none in the opposite direction. As a result, there is no morphism of Dl(R)
in either direction between the games (µR ◦Df (µR))(G) and (µR ◦ µDl(R))(G).
8 Towards the additives
In this section we briefly look at the question of how the completeness result in
section 5 should be extended to full LL. The intuition is that we are trying to
simulate the behaviour of the simultaneous quantifier in [19], in order to find a
better analogue to the characterisation theorem ϕ ˛ Æxy |ϕ|xy . This is ongoing
work by the author, and this section only outlines the method.
We extend the language of MELL as follows. For a double-indexed family
of formulas |ϕ|
X
Y we freely add a formula called
(
⊕x:X
&y:Y
)
|ϕ|
x
y . These new formulas
are called simultaneous additives (they could also be called ‘Henkin additives’,
because simultaneous quantifiers are a special case of Henkin quantifiers). The
definition is fully recursive, so the individual formulas |ϕ|xy may themselves be
simultaneous additives.
There is a single introduction rule for simultaneous additives. Suppose we
have double-indexed families of formulas |ϕi|
Xi
Yu
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and |ψj |
Uj
Vj
for
1 ≤ j ≤ n. For all functions
fj :
∏
i′
Xi′ ×
∏
j′ 6=j
Vj′ → Uj
gi :
∏
i′ 6=i
Xi′ ×
∏
j′
Vj′ → Yi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ n we have a proof rule
Γ,
(
|ϕi|
xi
gi(~x−i,~v)
)m
i=1
⊢ ∆,
(
|ψj |
fj(~x,~v−j)
vj
)n
j=1
for all ~x ∈
∏
iXi, ~v ∈
∏
j Vj
Γ,
((
⊕xi:Xi
&yi:Yi
)
|ϕi|
xi
yi
)m
i=1
⊢ ∆,
((
⊕uj :Uj
&vj :Vj
)
|ψj |
uj
vj
)n
j=1
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There is a hypothesis for all tuples ~x,~v, hence this rule is generally infinitary.
(The proof rule in [19] on which this is based uses free variables for ~x and ~v
instead; it might be necessary to impose a restriction that the subproofs are
‘uniform’ in the parameters in some way.) The extended language will be called
DLL.
We extend the valuation of formulas in a model D(R) to include simultane-
ous additives. If each |ϕ|
x
y is a formula in the language of DLL with interpre-
tation
∣∣∣|ϕ|xy ∣∣∣U
x
y
V xy
then the interpretation of
(
⊕x:X
&y:Y
)
|ϕ|xy is given precisely by the µ
operator: ∣∣∣∣
(
⊕x : X
&y : Y
)
|ϕ|
x
y
∣∣∣∣
∑
x:X
∏
y:Y U
x
y
∑
y:Y
∏
x:X V
x
y
:
(
x, f
y, g
)
7→
∣∣∣|ϕ|xy ∣∣∣fy
gx
It is an open question what should be the semantics of simultaneous additives
in an arbitrary category. If it exists, it must have properties of both a limit and
a colimit, since it includes products and coproducts as special cases.
Theorem 4. Let R be any category, then Dl(R) validates the simultaneous
additive introduction rule.
If we try to prove the equivalence of ϕ and
(
⊕x:X
&y:Y
)
|ϕ|
x
y , where ϕ is a formula
of LL, we find that we need some additional principles beyond DLL, corre-
sponding to the characterising principles of a functional interpretation. Two of
these are(
⊕x : X,u : U
&f : Y U , g : V X
)
|ϕ⊗ ψ|
x,u
f,g ⊸
(
⊕x : X
&y : Y
)
|ϕ|
x
y ⊗
(
⊕u : U
&v : V
)
|ψ|
u
v
and (
⊕z : X + U
&y : Y, v : V
)
|ϕ⊕ ψ|zy,v ⊸
(
⊕x : X
&y : Y
)
|ϕ|xy ⊕
(
⊕u : U
&v : V
)
|ψ|uv
The first is a propositional analogue of the parallel choice principle in [20], which
itself is a generalisation of the independence of premise principle. Write DLL#
for DLL extended with these axioms and others for the exponential. Then, by
directly simulating the characterisation theorem for a functional interpretation
it should be possible to prove that if R is sound and complete for MELL then
D(R) is sound and complete for DLL#. In particular, D(AG) should be a
sound and complete model of DLL#.
We continue by a purely syntactic argument. We prove that DLL has full
cut elimination, and is a conservative extension of LL by identifying the usual
additives with suitable simultaneous additives. Now if we take a formula ϕ in
the language of LL which is validated by D(AG), we know that ϕ is derivable
in DLL#, with a proof potentially involving both cuts and the characterising
principles. In particular, since ϕ does not contain simultaneous additives, any
simultaneous additives introduced in the proof by a characterising principle
must be removed by a cut. By analysing the ways in which cut elimination can
fail in the presence of characterising principles, it should be possible to identity
axioms in the language of LL which are sound and complete for D(AG).
As an example, consider the formula ⊥ ⊗ ⊤. This is not provable in LL,
because ϕ⊗ψ is provable in LL iff ϕ and ψ are both provable (by cut elimination)
and ⊥ is not provable. However every dialectica model has ⊥ ⊗ ⊤ ∼= ⊤, and
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in particular ⊥ ⊗ ⊤ is validated. Moreover for this simple example we can
generalise from the category of sets to any cartesian closed category, which is
the minimum structure needed to prove soundness. Therefore we can say that
there is no dialectica category which is both sound and complete for classical
linear logic.
On the positive side, dialectica categories are more often considered as mod-
els of intuitionistic linear logic, in which both witness and counter-witness sets
must be nonempty. Since this example does not apply in that setting, there is
still a possibility that we can construct complete dialectica models of intuition-
istic linear logic by this method.
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